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Abstract: Where there have been violations of labour standards or human rights
by organisations operating overseas, but such entities are either owned or con-
trolled by a transnational corporation (‘TNC’) based in a Common Law system
such as England and Wales, the current position in company, tort, contract and
private international law is that the right of injured overseas workers (of those
overseas entities) or citizens to recover the losses they have suffered from TNC is
negligible to zero. This is startling in light of policies underpinning product liabi-
lity and private laws. The question is whether modifications of existing private
and company law doctrines could facilitate a change in the position whereby
transnational corporations are held liable. Other possibilities for addressing the
TNC accountability gap are also discussed.
I Introduction
Any European legal system that (i) fails to recognise the liability of a transnational
enterprise located at the top of a corporate group or global supply chain, where its
activities are negligent or constitute an infringement of human rights norms and
are directly responsible for the serious injury or death of the employees of a third
party or the general public on the same territory as its registered office or (ii)
erects barriers to such individuals securing access to justice, is one that would
attract the opprobrium and criticism of all right-thinking lawyers; and rightly so.
However, where such injury or death occurs on the soil of another territory where
labour standards and human rights norms are weak and the relevant activities are
routed through a separate legal entity located in that jurisdiction, the tendency is
to shrug the shoulders and mutter that there is little that can be done, even
though the entity which is legally responsible for the careless and negligent con-
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duct that has caused the relevant misfortunes is one that is directly or indirectly
controlled by a transnational corporation located in a European legal system
where labour and human rights standards are high. Therein lies a paradox, since
it is generally accepted that the policy factors favouring the recognition of liability
of such a multinational business for overseas labour and human rights violations
are particularly strong, tending to outweigh the opposing arguments. The chal-
lenge lies in the fact that the doctrines of the private and company laws of Euro-
pean legal systems have lagged well behind the received currency of those policy
considerations.
In this article, the UK is taken as an example of one of those European legal
systems, in order to provide a particularly Common Law perspective. Like other
European countries, the legal system in the UK – which is grounded in the Com-
mon Law tradition – has traditionally rejected or been slow to develop the requi-
site doctrinal tools that are available in its armoury to enable such liability to be
imposed on such transnational corporations. Of course, the question is whether
there is any way in which such existing instruments can be bent into shape to
reflect and realise the compelling policy considerations pointing towards the im-
position of liability of multinational companies located in the UK.1 That is a
question to which this article is devoted, and as will be noted, recent develop-
ments show glimpses of some (albeit conditional and limited) promise in that
direction.
In this article, the principles in the law of tort and contract, as well as com-
pany law and private international law in the territories of England and Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland that are relevant to this topic will be taken as a
proxy for the ‘Common Law’. In the third section, these rules will be described in
order to provide an up-to-date account of the scope for liability to be imposed on
multinationals that are parent companies or positioned at the upper tier of a glo-
bal supply chain. A summary of the main doctrinal challenges will then be pre-
sented. At that point, the discussion will turn to a survey of the possible adapta-
1 For discussion generally on the imposition of liability on transnational corporations for human
rights violations of their subsidiaries or entities in a supply chain, seeK McCall-Smith/A Ruhmkorf,
Sustainable Global Supply Chains: From Transparency to Due Diligence, in: C Gammage/T Novitz
(eds), Sustainable Trade, Investment and Finance: Towards Responsible and Coherent Regulatory
Frameworks (2019);K McCall-Smith/A Ruhmkorf, From International Law toNational Law:TheOp-
portunities and Limits of Contractual CSR Supply Chain Governance, in: V Ulfbeck/A Andhov/
K Mitkidis (eds), LawandResponsible Supply ChainManagement: Contract and Tort Interplay and
Overlap (2019) 15 and K McCall-Smith/A Ruhmkorf, Reconciling Human Rights and supply chain
management through corporate social responsibility, in: V Ruiz Abou-Nigm/K McCall-Smith/
D French (eds), Linkages and Boundaries in Private and Public International Law (2018) 147–174.
Transnational Corporations and Labour Standards Violations 109
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/18/19 8:28 PM
tions that could be made to the law to strike a much fairer allocation of responsi-
bility, before concluding. But first, the following section will set the scene by pro-
viding an illustration of the classic set of fact patterns where human rights and
labour standards are violated in an overseas territory.
II The paradigm example of a human rights and
labour standards violation
The paradigm example where compelling policy factors favour the imposition of
liability involves a transnational or multinational company (TNC or MNC) A
whose registered office or principal place of business is in a home jurisdiction
situated in the global north or west, eg the UK. Being a highly mobile entity en-
gaged in commercial business worldwide, the TNC A will seek to push down the
costs of production of its products or services as much as is practically possible.
For example, it will source the labour necessary for the manufacture of its pro-
ducts from territories throughout the world where labour costs are low. More often
than not, the chosen jurisdiction will be based in a territory located in the global
south, which we will call ‘Ruritania’ for the want of a better name. The TNC Amay
also seek to secure raw materials, such as copper ore, indium, tantalum, etc,
which are scarce. Once again, for the sake of argument and simplicity, let’s say
that the relevant jurisdiction where these minerals are found is Ruritania. Of
course, it is well known that companies such as TNC A operating at the vanguard
of the knowledge economy may structure their global production processes in a
way that gives rise to a corporate group structure,2 with overseas subsidiaries B1,
B2, B3, etc, specifically incorporated in Ruritania. In this way, the industrial orga-
nisation of the TNC A is naturally oriented towards the vertical integration of pro-
duction,3 where bureaucratic controls inherent within the group are harnessed to
2 For discussion of corporate groups, see T Hadden, Regulating Corporate Groups: An Interna-
tional Perspective, in: J McCahery/S Picciotto/C Scott (eds), Corporate Control andAccountability:
Changing Structures and Dynamics of Regulation (1993) 343; J Dine, Governance of Corporate
Groups (2000); PI Blumberg/KA Strasser/NL Georgakopoulos, The Law of Corporate Groups
(2007) and C Witting, The Liability of Corporate Groups and Networks (2018).
3 SeeOE Williamson, TheOrganization ofWork, (1980) Journal of Economic Behavior andOrgani-
sation 5, 25; SJ Grossman/OD Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and
Lateral Integration, (1986) 94 Journal of Political Economy 691;Oliver E Williamson, The Economic
Institutions of Capitalism – Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (1985) 60 f; and H Collins, Reg-
ulating Contracts (1999) 163.
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direct and allocate resources and execute corporate decision-making.4 The alter-
native option is to adopt a vertically disintegrated structure5 where the necessary
manufacturing labour and raw materials are sourced from third party suppliers
BA1, BA2, BA3, etc, contractors BB1, BB2, BB3, etc, and sub-contractors BC1, BC2,
BC3 operating at one or more steps removed from the TNC A which are based in
the overseas jurisdiction. This entails the TNC A engaging in global supply chain
management, whereby the TNC A concludes a series or chain of commercial con-
tracts or arrangements or policies with each of its suppliers BA1, contractors BB1,
or sub-contractors BC1 in Ruritania. It is not uncommon that human rights and
labour standards are woefully inferior, or access to justice is impaired, in Rurita-
nia, in comparison with those legal protections recognised in the home jurisdic-
tion of TNC A: such is the way of the world. It is also important to stress that un-
like corporate groups, the control exerted by the TNC A over its arms-length sup-
pliers BA1, contractors BB1, or sub-contractors BC1 is not bureacratic but
avowedly contractual in nature. In essence, it is the terms of the commercial con-
tract that are tailored (by pressing the totemic doctrine of freedom of contract into
service) to provide TNC A with the requisite bargaining power to subordinate the
suppliers BA1, contractors BB1, and sub-contractors BC1 to its will. In this way,
the bureacratic controlwielded by TNC A in the case of a corporate group structure
that is conferred by corporate law is substituted for legal contractual controls in
the case of global supply chain management systems.
Where death or injury is caused to individuals and/or workers C by those
arms-length suppliers BA1, contractors BB1, or sub-contractors BC1, in the supply
chain, the queston is whether there is scope for TNC A liability in the UK as the
home state, since the barriers to justice experienced by the injured workers or
citizens C in the host state Ruritania may be formidable, and the private law in-
adequately developed or unsophisticated. The same point is equally applicable
where TNC A has organised its affairs through a corporate group. In this situa-
tion, it would be overseas subsidiaries B1, B2, or B3, etc specifically incorporated
in the host state territories that had caused the injury or death of the workers or
citizens C.
In recent years, the frequency with which TNCs A have incorporated CSR po-
licies or codes of conduct into their commercial contracts or arrangements with
their overseas partners has gathered apace. Those codes of conduct will often im-
pose obligations on TNC A’s subsidiaries B1, or suppliers BA1, contractors BB1, or
4 SeeH Collins, Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employ-
ment Protection Laws (1990) 10Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 353, 362 for the distinction between
bureaucratic and contractual control mechanisms.
5 Andrew L Friedman, Industry and Labour (1977) 114–129.
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sub-contractors BC1.6 It may bind them to adhere to soft law norms, such as the
labour standards promulgated by the International Labour Organization (ILO).7
Likewise, the obligations may cover respect for human rights, consisting of norms
issued by the UN Global Compact,8 the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR),9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),10 Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD),11 the United Nations (UN) (UN -
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights)12 and/or the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (prevention of trafficking in human
beings for labour exploitation in supply chains).13 TNC A may also decide to in-
corporate codes of conduct that are based on regulations promulgated at the na-
tional law level to address the violation of basic protection standards of supply
chains.14 These contractually binding codes of conduct will cover transgressions
from the payment of substandard wages to more extreme wrongdoing, such as
unsafe workplace conditions, modern slavery, child labour and forced labour.
III Private law
The law regulating tort, companies and contracts, as well as private international
law in the UK as the home state of the TNC A will play a central role in determin-
ing whether the injured host state employees or citizens C will have a legal claim
against the TNC A. In the following sections, each of these areas of law are scru-
tinised to identify their main weaknesses and any recent developments which
6 SeeMcCall-Smith/Ruhmkorf, Reconciling HumanRights (fn 1) 147–174 andMcCall-Smith/Ruhm-
korf, From International Law to National Law (fn 1) 15.
7 See <https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/lang–en/index.htm> (last visited 20 May 2019). For
an overview of the standards-related work of the ILO, see ‘Rules of the Game’ available at <https://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—normes/documents/publication/wcm
s_672549.pdf> (last visited 20 May 2019).
8 See the ten principles at <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles>
(last visited 20 May 2019).
9 See <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf> (last visited 20 May 2019).
10 See <https://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf> (last visited 20 May
2019).
11 See <https://www.oecd.org/about/> (last visited 20 May 2019).
12 See <https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf>
(last visited 20 May 2019).
13 See <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/237571> (last visited 20 May 2019).
14 Eg California: California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010, United Kingdom:Modern
Slavery Act 2015, France: Loi Rana Plaza.
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may cause us to pause and ask if the potential for TNC A liability is beginning to
emerge.
A Tort law
In Common Law systems, the judiciary have harboured a long-standing reluc-
tance to adapt the rules of tort law to recognise liability in such circumstances if
there is the potential for ‘indeterminate liability’ to third parties. This is known as
the ‘floodgates’ argument. And it is a very common theme when courts reject the
case for an extension in the frontiers of liability in tort. Where a tort has been
committed by a subsidiary or supplier, the technique for the achievement of such
a result is to say that the TNC A has itself committed no actionable wrong. The
Common Law clings to the doctrine of separate legal personality in company
law,15 which serves as a useful tool in that regard. In principle, where the TNC A
is the parent company of an overseas subsidiary B1, it is theoretically possible to
pierce the corporate veil to confer a right of recovery in favour of C against TNC A
where B1 is liable to C.16 This is rooted in the idea that TNC A owns the shares of,
and thus controls, subsidiary B1 and the veil of incorporation ought to be pene-
trated to clothe the former with liability. However, the doctrine of separate legal
personality is so impregnable that any exceptions to its functioning that are re-
cognised by the Common Law are very narrow indeed. The courts will only dis-
regard the doctrine that the overseas subsidiary B1 is a separate legal entity where
it has been specifically created to conceal the real actors that lie behind TNC A,17
or to enable TNC A to evade any of its existing legal obligations or crystallised
liabilities.18 Seen from this perspective, tort law would appear to be subordinate
to (this central doctrine of) company law.19 This discussion accentuates the funda-
mental point that the Common Law treats corporate groups as nothing sinister
and as a wholly natural way to structure commercial operations, unless the over-
seas subsidiary company B1 has been set up specifically as a means of giving the
parent company A the potential to circumvent its legal duties. For the reason that
15 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] Appeal Cases (AC) 22.
16 However, this would not be relevant in the case where the TNC A operated through a global
supply chain, since therewould be no corporate veil to pierce in the case of suppliers BA1, contrac-
tors BB1 or sub-contractors BC1.
17 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd. [2013] 2 AC 415, 484C-F per Lord Sumption.
18 Ibid.
19 See the discussions concerning the relationship between tort and company law in the chapters
in CEF Rickett/R Grantham, Corporate Personality in the 20th Century (1998).
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B1’s liability to C is only likely to arise after the event, this is very seldom the case.
For example, in Adams v Cape Industries,20 the liability of a parent company to
victims of asbestos was rejected where they had a judgment from the court of a
state in the US against one of its overseas subsidiaries and the latter had been
incorporated well in advance of the crystallisation of those liabilities to the vic-
tims.
We now turn back to the fundamental question of whether there is scope for
TNC A to be liable in UK tort law to the injured workers or citizens C where the
relevant loss has been sustained as a result of the actions or conduct of TNC A’s
overseas subsidiary B1 or an overseas supplier BA1, contractor BB1, or sub-con-
tractor BC1. Here, we must draw a distinction between primary liability and vicar-
ious liability in tort for negligence. As regards the potential for primary liability,
for the reasons given above, this was traditionally limited. But we have recently
witnessed a resurgence in tort law in the UK as a result of the decision in the
English Court of Appeal in Chandler v Cape plc,21 which was recently explained by
the UK Supreme Court in Vedanta Resources plc v Lungowe.22 In many respects,
this socially progressive adaptation of the law of negligence in UK tort law has
been achieved at the expense of company law to the extent that it functions to
soften (or some might argue, outflank) the rigidity of the doctrine on piercing the
corporate veil. Here, it was held that there is nothing special about a parent and
subsidiary case in the law of tort as regards the appropriate test for the imposition
of a primary duty of care in negligence. The relevant tests to be met are as follows,
which will also apply to subject TNC A to liability for losses caused to third party
employees or citizens C in the supply chain context, ie where they are caused by
an arms-length supplier BA1, contractor BB1 or sub-contractor BC1, etc:
1. TNC A and the overseas corporation B1 (that has caused the relevant loss to C)
must be in a relevant respect the same businesses;
2. TNC A must have, or should have, superior knowledge on some relevant as-
pects of health and safety in the relevant industry;
3. The overseas corporation B1’s system of working in the overseas jurisdiction
is unsafe, as the TNC A must have known, or ought to have known; and
4. TNC A knew or ought to have foreseen that the overseas corporation B1, its
employees or the third party citizens C would rely on TNC A actively deploy-
ing its superior knowledge to protect C. Where there is evidence of TNC A
20 [1990] LawReports, Chancery Division (Ch) 433.
21 [2012] 1Weekly Law Reports (WLR) 3111.
22 [2019] United KingdomSupreme Court (UKSC) 20, [2019] 2WLR 1051.
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intervening in, or controlling, the trading operations of overseas company B1,
eg in respect of production or funding, this criterion will be satisfied.23
In Vedanta, the Supreme Court clarified the legal position post-Chandler by ex-
plaining that the above criteria should not be treated as if they have statutory
force but instead as a useful set of particular illustrations as to when a duty of
care may be said to arise.24 To that extent, circumstances in which a duty of care
may arise ought not to be limited to the four criteria above. Instead, a broader
range of circumstances grounded on supervision, control, intervention, and as-
sumption of the relevant risks by TNC A will give rise to a primary duty of care. As
for the requisite level of control or intervention on the part of TNC A at 4 above,
Lord Briggs in Vedanta was of the view that this could be demonstrated where (i)
guidelines are promulgated by TNC A to reduce the environmental impact of op-
erations, but these contain systemic errors that result in harm to workers or citi-
zens such as C when they are put into effect by A’s overseas subsidiary B1 or over-
seas supplier BA1, contractor BB1, or sub-contractor BC1,25 (ii) TNC A takes active
steps to ensure that A’s overseas subsidiary B1 or overseas supplier BA1, contrac-
tor BB1, or sub-contractor BC1 implements a policy through training, supervision
and enforcement,26 and (iii) TNC A assumes responsibility to the injured workers
or citizens C through, for example, publishing various materials in which A is held
out as exercising a degree of supervision and control over its overseas subsidiary
B1 or overseas supplier BA1, contractor BB1, or sub-contractor BC1.27
Despite the promise inherent within this development in tort law in the UK,
experience has shown that many cases fall down on one or more of the above four
limbs. For example, in AAA v Unilever plc,28 the employee and resident claimants
C were unable to establish that A had intervened in the business operations of B1
to such an extent that limb 4 was met, ie the requisite reliance by C on TNC A. TNC
A had not integrated its operations with that of B1 and had not given any particu-
lar advice to B1 about the management of a particular risk. Likewise, in Thompson
v Renwick Group Plc,29 it was held that the decision of TNC A to appoint a health
and safety director to the board of the overseas subsidiary B1 did not give rise to a
duty of care to employees C of subsidiary B1 on the basis that this was insufficient
23 [2012] 1WLR 3111, 3131F-H at paras [80]–[81] per Arden LJ.
24 [2019] UKSC 20, [2019] 2WLR 1051, 1069H per Lord Briggs.
25 [2019] UKSC 20, [2019] 2WLR 1051, 1068F-G per Lord Briggs.
26 [2019] UKSC 20, [2019] 2WLR 1051, 1069A per Lord Briggs.
27 [2019] UKSC 20, [2019] 2WLR 1051, 1069B per Lord Briggs.
28 [2018] Court of Appeal, Civil Division (EWCA Civ) 1532, [2018] British Company Case (BCC) 959.
29 [2015] BCC 855.
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to give rise to the requisite intervention or control in its operations in terms of
limb 4 above. In essence, if the operations of A and B1 are co-ordinated or inter-
mingled, that will not be enough, as limbs 3 and 4 will remain unfulfilled.
Furthermore, even though TNC A may produce a corporate group human rights
due diligence policy based on the aforementioned UN Guiding Principles30 or a
broadly equivalent labour standards due diligence policy, which it renders ap-
plicable to dealings by its overseas subsidiaries B1, or overseas supply chain part-
ners (such as suppliers BA1, contractors BB1 or sub-contractors BC1), such poli-
cies will be couched in purely aspirational language, or confined to processes and
procedures that TNC A and its subsidiaries and supply chain partners will adopt
or pursue, rather than speak to the achievement of specific outcomes. It is unli-
kely that such a form of communication in TNC A’s corporate group human rights
or labour standards due diligence policy will be sufficient to trigger the recogni-
tion of liability for the breach of a primary duty of care in the Common Law of
negligence, as the requisite level of intervention, supervision or control by TNC
A will be absent. Written statements in policies confirming how TNC A and its
overseas subsidiaries or overseas supply chain partners will seek to implement
systems designed to either prevent or reduce instances of labour standards or hu-
man rights violations lack the edge that is necessary to engage a duty of care post-
Vedanta.
A completely disparate issue concerns the potential for TNC A to be held vi-
cariously liable for the tortious and negligent conduct of overseas corporation B1.
In UK law, this requires satisfaction of the factors that were adumbrated by Lord
Reed in the UK Supreme Court in its decision in Cox v MoJ.31 First, it must be de-
monstrated that harm was wrongfully done by subsidiary B1, or supplier BA1,
contractor BB1 or sub-contractor BC1, which is engaged in activities as an integral
part of the commercial activities carried on by TNC A and for the latter’s benefit,
rather than those activities being wholly attributable to the conduct of a recogni-
sably independent business of B1’s own or that of a third party. If this criterion is
satisfied, it is also a requirement that the commission of the wrongful act is a risk
that was created by TNC A assigning those activities to corporation B1. As such,
the first factor involves establishing that the business of corporation B1 is inte-
grated with the commercial operations of TNC A. It is on this limb that a great
multitiude of vicarious liability claims by injured employees or citizens C against
TNC A will falter. The main challenge posed by the Cox test is that vicarious liabi-
30 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: see <https://www.ohchr.org/docu
ments/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf> (last visited 20 May 2019).
31 [2016] UKSC 10; [2016] AC 660, 670E-G at para [24].
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lity will only apply to impose liability on TNC A if the overseas subsidiary B1 or
local supplier BA1, contractor BB1, or sub-contractor BC1, do not function as in-
dependent or autonomous business operations. This will demand an analysis of
the operational capacities and capabilities of both organisations, but it would be
unusual for a subsidiary or local supplier or contractor to be so integrated with
the operations of TNC A that they were either dependent on TNC A or de facto one
and the same business. For that reason, the law of vicarious liability in the Com-
mon Law is unlikely to offer much success to the injured employees or citizens C.
B Contract law
Having thrown some sand in the machinery, or expressed a degree of caution at
least, as regards the scope for establishing primary or vicarious liability in the
tortious law of negligence, at this juncture, a separate line of enquiry concerns
the ability of contract law to offer C relief from TNC A. Contract law is a particular
site of relevance in this enquiry, since the discussion earlier in this article identi-
fied the growing frequency with which TNCs are expressly incorporating Codes of
Conduct into their commercial contracts with partners in their supply chains.
Those Codes will include references to CSR, labour standards and human rights
frameworks that impose expectations about the behaviour of those supplier part-
ners when they conduct activities in the overseas jurisdiction.32 In such a case, the
question arises as to whether it would be possible for third parties such as injured
employees or citizens C to establish a form of legal recourse under such Codes of
Conduct. The principal factor in Common Law countries, which has traditionally
constituted an obstacle to parties such as C, is the extent to which they cling to the
doctrine of privity of contract. The privity of contract doctrine excludes the scope
for third parties to have recourse under a bilateral contract concluded between
TNC A and overseas subsidiary B1 or local overseas supplier BA1, contractor BB1,
or sub-contractor BC1. The main objective of the privity doctrine is twofold: first,
to insulate contracting parties such as TNC A and B1, BA1, BB1 or BC1 from liabi-
lity to third parties C; and secondly, to ensure that third parties C are not encum-
bered under contracts to which they were not a party.33 On this basis, the potential
for contract law to play any role does indeed seem scant.
32 SeeMcCall-Smith/Ruhmkorf, SustainableGlobal SupplyChains (fn 1);McCall-Smith/Ruhmkorf,
From International Law to National Law (fn 1) 15 andMcCall-Smith/Ruhmkorf, Reconciling Human
Rights (fn 1) 147–174.
33 Sir Anthony Mason, Privity – A Rule in Search of Decent Burial? in: P Kincaid (ed), Privity: Pri-
vate Justice of Public Regulation (2001) 88 at 88;VV Palmer, The Paths to Privity: A History of Third
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However, we should not lose sight of the fact that the Common Law does
recognise certain exceptions to the privity doctrine. First, where loss results from
a breach of a contract between D and E, but the loss has somehow (wholly or
partly) ‘transferred’ to F, the Common Law has accepted that there is a legal ‘black
hole’34 that must be addressed. This is achieved via ‘the transferred loss doctrine’,
which attempts to limit or remove the effects of the black hole by allowing con-
tracting party D to advance a claim against E in respect of F’s loss under the con-
tract between D and E, notwithstanding that F is not a party to it.35 Likewise, the
doctrine of undisclosed agency also amounts to an exception to the doctrine of
privity of contract. Here, on the instructions of the principal, an agent fails to
disclose his/her office to a third party, in which case the third party does not know
or believe him/her to be acting for a principal, whose identity is never revealed to
the third party. When the agent enters into a contract with the third party, not-
withstanding the privity of contract doctrine, the law of agency in Common Law
systems recognises that the principal is bound by the contract with the third party
and can be sued by the third party under that contract or sue the third party him/
herself.36 Another illustration of an exception to privity is provided by the doctrine
of ‘contracts for the benefit of another’. This doctrine provides that where a con-
tract is entered into between A and B for the benefit of C, A may recover damages
from B in respect of C’s losses resulting from B’s defective contractual perfor-
mance. As such, C has no legal right to recover a remedy, but one of the contract-
ing parties A can do so on his/her behalf.37 Finally, there are numerous statutory
Party Beneficiary Contracts at English Law (1992) 7; M Furmston/GJ Tolhurst, Privity of Contract
(2015); J Baker, Privity of Contract in the Common Law before 1680, in: EJH Schrage (ed), Ius quae-
situm tertio (2008) 35 at 35.
34 J Dykes Ltd v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd, 1982 Scots Law Times (SLT) 50, 54 per Lord
Stewart.
35 See Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518;McLaren Murdoch & Ha-
milton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group, 2003 Scottish Civil Law Reports (SCLR) 323, para 33 per
Lord DrummondYoung; J Dykes Ltd v LittlewoodsMail Order Stores Ltd, 1982 Session Cases, House
of Lords (SC (HL)) 157, 166 per Lord Stewart; Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael
Craig [2015] Scotland Court of Session, Outer House (CSOH) 4, para 29 per Lord Doherty; The Most
Honourable Alexander George Gordon, Marquess of Aberdeen and Temair v Messrs Turcan Connell,
2008 CSOH 183, para 45 per Lady Smith;G Jackson, The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclo-
paedia: Obligations: Contract, vol 15 (1995) (hereinafter SME) para 158;M Hogg, Obligations (2nd
edn 2006) 3.174.
36 Hutton vBulloch (1874) LawReporter (LR) 9Queen’sBench (QB) 572;ThomsonvDavenport, 1829
9Barnewall&Cresswell’sKing’sBenchReports (B&C) 78;Bennet v InvereskPaperCo, 1891 18Rettie
975.
37 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1WLR 1468 at 1473 per Lord Denning.
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exceptions, where the privity doctrine is disposed of on the basis of certain policy
considerations.38
Recent scholarship has demonstrated that each of these exceptions are reflec-
tive of a variety of policy factors.39 Three of these policy factors are particularly
powerful. First, where the third party C is physically or financially weak, C’s loss
was reasonably foreseeable to the contracting parties A and B, and C could not
reasonably have been expected to protect him/herself in advance, there is a
weighty case for the privity doctrine to give way in favour of the protection of that
weaker third party C.40 Likewise, where it is felt that there is a pressing case for the
third party C to be entitled to recover the loss he/she has suffered as a result of a
contractual breach.41 Finally, an exception to the privity doctrine will be justified
where it is a matter of commercial necessity or convenience.42 Bearing these pol-
icy considerations in mind, we must ask whether contract law in England, Wales
and Scotland ought to be refined so that privity is bypassed to offer C relief from
TNC A where A has entered into a contract with its overseas subsidiary B1 or over-
seas supplier BA1, contractor BB1, or sub-contractor BC1.
On balance, there may be a case to do so on the basis of the first policy factor,
ie that the third parties C are physically or financially weak, their loss was reason-
ably foreseeable to the contracting parties TNC A and its subsidiary B1 or overseas
supplier BA1, contractor BB1, or sub-contractor BC1, and the claim that C could
not reasonably have been expected to protect themselves in advance is undoubt-
edly plausible. The main obstacle, therefore, concerns the question of reasonable
foreseeability of C’s loss. On the one hand, one can argue that it is reasonably
foreseeable that a failure on the part of subsidiary B1 or overseas supplier BA1,
contractor BB1, or sub-contractor BC1 to adhere to the labour standards and hu-
man rights obligations in the contractual Code of Conduct will give rise to loss
sustained by C. On the other hand, it is not a foregone conclusion that injured
workers or citizens such as C could not have taken active steps to protect them-
selves from their injuries in advance, eg through insurance or subsidiary B1, sup-
plier BA1, contractor BB1, or sub-contractor BC1 procuring insurance cover for
38 Married Women’s Property Act 1882, Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, Third Parties (Rights
against Insurers) Act 2010, Defective Premises Act 1972, Latent Damage Act 1986, Fire Prevention
(Metropolis) Act 1774, Consumer Protection Act 1987 Part I and the Package Travel and Linked Tra-
vel Arrangements Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/634).
39 Seeunpublished thesis byL MacFarlane, Privity andExceptions toPrivity in Scots Private Law:
A New Taxonomy (July 2018, on file with author).
40 Seeunpublished thesis byL MacFarlane, Privity andExceptions toPrivity in Scots Private Law:
A New Taxonomy (July 2018, on file with author) 282.
41 See ibid.
42 See ibid.
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their express benefit. Another possibility is that third party beneficiary theory
could be adapted to offer C some relief under the contract concluded between TNC
A and its subsidiary B1 or overseas supplier BA1, contractor BB1, or sub-contractor
BC1. In fact, English law and Scots law both recognise the concept of a jus quae-
situm tertio, as enshrined in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 and
the Contract (Third Party Rights) Scotland Act 2019. As such, there should be
some potential for third parties such as C to obtain a remedy. However, the main
difficulty with this line of argument is that it is routine legal practice in the UK for
commercial contracts to exclude the possibility of third party rights. Even more
important is the fact that a third party such as C will be denied relief if they are not
specifically named in the contract or a description provided of the class or group
of person to which C belongs.43 For obvious reasons, it is unlikely that the Code of
Conduct incorporated into the contract between TNC A and its subsidiary B1 or
overseas supplier BA1, contractor BB1, or sub-contractor BC1 will have done so,
for the principal reason that such a voluntary course of action will explicitly open
up TNC A to liability to C. Why would TNC A take, or its legal advisers recom-
mend, such a counter-intuitive step?
C Private international law
Notwithstanding each of the difficulties versed above, even if it is the case that C
is able to establish a claim in English or Scots tort/delict or contract law against
TNC A for the actions of its subsidiary B1 or overseas supplier BA1, contractor BB1,
or sub-contractor BC1, there are still hurdles in private international law which
must be overcome. In effect, C must demonstrate that the courts in England,
Wales or Scotland have jurisdiction to hear their claim against A. Secondly, C
must also persuade the court that the proper law applying to the tortious or con-
tractual dispute ought to be English or Scots law.
If we turn first to the rules of private international law that are in play where
there is a question of jurisdiction of the English, Welsh or Scots courts in a tor-
tious dispute, the Brussels I Recast Regulation will apply.44 Article 4 of the Brus-
sels I Recast Regulation dispenses with the plea of forum non conveniens by pro-
viding that jurisdiction in tort is to be governed by the domicile of the defendant
43 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 sec 1(3) and Contract (Third Party Rights) Scotland
Act 2019 sec 1(3).
44 Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] Official Jour-
nal (OJ) L 351/1.
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A. In the case of TNC A, that will be its registered office or place of incorporation.
For a recent example of the application of art 4, Vedanta is a case in point. Here,
toxins from a copper mine were discharged into a watercourse in Zambia. Various
Zambian citizens were injured and sued both the Zambian subsidiary of a parent
company incorporated in England and the parent itself, in the English courts. The
Supreme Court ruled that art 4 permitted the English courts to establish jurisdic-
tion in respect of the parent company registered in England and that this was not
an abusive application of EU law. In addition, it was also held that each of the
defendants, including the Zambian defendants, could be sued in England, since
the risk that substantial justice would not be obtained in Zambia was high enough
that it was justified for the English courts to have jurisdiction. As for whether the
relevant jurisdiction will be the home state of TNC A in England where the legal
dispute is based on contract law, art 25 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation on the
prorogation of jurisdiction will assume importance. In essence, this article pre-
serves the right of the parties to enter into a choice-of-court arrangement in their
commercial contract. While it is absolutely certain that TNC A and B1, BA1, BB1 or
BC1 will insert a clause prorogating jurisdiction in their contract, the likelihood,
however, that TNC A would specify England, Wales or Scotland as the appropriate
jurisdiction for the resolution of any contractual dispute it may have with its sub-
sidiary B1 or overseas supplier BA1, contractor BB1, or sub-contractor BC1, is very
low. For that reason, as a matter of practical reality, the scope for the English,
Welsh or Scottish courts to have jurisidiction over the dispute is, once again, lim-
ited.
In the unlikely scenario that the English courts do have jurisdiction to hear
the evidence in the tortious or contractual dispute, there are certain practical
challenges that must be overcome. Leaving aside the question of the wisdom and
cost of transferring the written evidence and transporting the relevant witnesses
all across the world from Ruritania to the UK, there is the issue of the governing
law to be applied in the English, Welsh or Scottish courts. Should the proper law
be English law/Scots law, or the law applicable in the jurisdictions where C are/
were resident? Here, we must resort to the detail of the Rome I and Rome II Regu-
lations,45 which cover the proper law to be applied to contractual and non-con-
tractual disputes. The Rome II Regulation identifies the governing law in the case
of a tortious dispute between TNC A and the injured workers or citizens C. Arti-
cle 4(1) prescribes the general rule that the governing law in tort will be the law of
45 Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual ob-
ligations [2008] OJ L 177/6 (Rome I Regulation) and Parliament and Council Regulation (EC)
No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations [2007] OJ L 199/40 (Rome II R-
egulation).
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the country in which the damage occurred, irrespective of the country in which
the event giving rise to the damage occurred. As such, if C are injured in Ruritania
and the English or Scottish courts are seized of jurisdiction to hear the dispute,
they will be bound to apply the tort law of Ruritania, ie the lex loci delicti. How-
ever, art 4(1) is a provision that does admit of exceptions. As such, it is subject to
two principal carve-outs. First, the law of another country will apply if the TNC A
and C have their habitual residence in the same territory.46 For obvious reasons,
that is of scant import in the paradigm example we painted in section II above.
However, the second exception may hold more relevance. Here, it is provided that
where the damage or injury caused to C is manifestly more closely connected with
another country, the law of that other country will apply to the dispute.47 The
relevant article in the Rome II Regulation goes on to provide illustrations as to
when such a manifestly closer connection might arise. For example, where there
is a pre-existing relationship between the TNC A and C established under a con-
tractual agreement, that will suffice. In the case at hand, it is stretching matters to
conceive of a situation in which C would have ever been in some form of prior
contractual arrangement with TNC A before the onset of any illness, injury or
fatality. To that extent, once again, the capacity of a law other than the law of
Ruritania to assume any relevance in any tortious dispute is slim to zero.
We now turn to consider the relevance of the Rome I Regulation. Of course,
here we are operating on the arguably contestable basis that C may have the po-
tential to harness some exception to the privity doctrine, such as a third party
right, to exert a claim in contract against TNC A pursuant to the contract con-
cluded between TNC A and its overseas subsidiary B1, or one of its suppliers BA1,
contractors BB1 or sub-contractors BC1, located in Ruritania, in the global supply
chain management context. Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation provides that
where C is seeking to rely on the terms of such a commercial contract entered into
between TNC A and its overseas subsidiary or supplier, contractor, or sub-con-
tractor, then the applicable law govering the contractual dispute is the law chosen
in the contract itself. What is a commercial certainty is that on the recommenda-
tion of its professional advisers, TNC A will have inserted a governing law clause
in that contract. However, although a possibility, the prospect that TNC A will
have picked the law of Ruritania to govern any disagreements it may have with
its subsidary B1, supplier BA1, contractor BB1 or sub-contractor BC1, is far from
assured. For that reason, there is restricted scope for C to obtain relief based on
the English or Scots law of contract, and even if the jurisdiction of the English or
46 Article 4(2) of the Rome II Regulation.
47 Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation.
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Scottish courts is established, C will have no option but to fall back on the law of
Ruritania, which as noted above, is likely to be under-developed and offer limited
rights of recourse.
D Summary of principal legal challenges
The combination of English/Scottish tort/delict law, contract law, company law
and private international law amounts to a toxic mix that will inevitably present a
formidable hurdle to C obtaining any form of compensatory relief from TNC A in
its home state in the UK. This leads us to question whether there are potential
additional options entailing the evolution of existing rules in the private law
doctrine of the UK, or otherwise. It is this question we cover in the following sec-
tion IV.
IV Potential future approaches
There are a number of possible adaptations of existing private law doctrine –
some admittedly more theoretical than others – that might achieve the desired
policy of closing the TNC A accountability gap. The first that comes to mind is the
concept of dual liability, which has been recognised in English tort law. This has
arisen within the specific context of the identification of the appropriate party for
the imposition of vicarious liability where an employee is ‘borrowed’ from an-
other employer and owing to the fault of that employee, a third party suffers loss.
In the case of Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd,48 the
English Court of Appeal decided that there was no precedential or conceptual
impediment to English law accepting that dual vicarious liability could be im-
posed on two employers. Lord Justice May opined that such dual liability would
arise where it could be established that both parties exercised dual control over
the employee.49 However, whilst not discounting the relevance of evidence of
shared control, Lord Justice Rix preferred a broader test for the recognition of dual
liability, which he conceived of as arising where the employee was so much part
of or integrated into, the work, business, or organisation of both employers that it
was just to make both employers answer for his negligence.50 Whether such dual
48 [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] QB 510.
49 [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] QB 510, 519E-527H per May LJ.
50 [2005] EWCA Civ 1151, [2006] QB 510, 536E-537E per Rix LJ. See also the discussion inHawley v
Luminar Leisure Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 18, [2006] paras [82]–[86] per Hallett LJ.
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control or integration arises will be based on a forensic factual investigation as to
how responsbility for the various functions giving rise to the risks and damage
caused has been parcelled out or shared by the two relevant legal entities. By
abstracting these rules which delimit the scope for dual liability from their source
in the norms regulating the law of vicarious liability and the borrowing of employ-
ees, and then harnessing their application within the not dissimilar context of the
TNC A accountability gap described in this article, it would not entail an excessive
stretching of the existing private law doctrine to create the potential for both TNC
A and its overseas subsidiary B1 or supplier BA1, contractor BB1 or sub-contractor
BC1 to be held liable to C. The principal difference would be that rather than vi-
carious liability being borne by TNC A for the negligent conduct of its employees
or the employees of its overseas subsidiary B1 or supplier BA1, contractor BB1 or
sub-contractor BC1, instead, the rules would be refined to impose dual primary or
vicarious liability on TNC A and B1, BA1, BB1 or BC1 for the activities or decisions
of B1, BA1, BB1 or BC1 where such conduct is the foundation of the injuries to the
employees C of B1, BA1, BB1 or BC1. Of course, based on the existing rules in the
law of vicarious liability, such dual liability would only emerge if both TNC A and
B1, BA1, BB1 or BC1 shared control over the injured employees C, or it was possi-
ble to demonstrate that C was sufficiently integrated into the commercial opera-
tions of both TNC A and B1, BA1, BB1 or BC1. However, the difficulty is that certain
pragmatic factors will marr the potential for such an adaptation to be successful.
For the reason that TNC A will routinely arrange its commercial affairs in a man-
ner which keeps both B1, BA1, BB1 or BC1 and C at a lengthy distance, even such a
doctrinal refinement is unlikely to hold much promise as regards the filling of the
TNC A accountability gap. In other words, the relevant tests attaching to the new
legal position would be problematic to the extent that they would merely serve to
derive a normative proposition that both TNC A and overseas subsidiary B1 or
supplier BA1, contractor BB1 or sub-contractor BC1 ought to be liable where they
either (i) exercise dual control over the activities of the injured employees or citi-
zens C, or (ii) the latter are integrated into the organisational and commercial
structures of both TNC A and B1, BA1, BB1 or BC1, from a descriptive reality, ie
that both TNC A and B1, BA1, BB1 or BC1 are liable because both (i) and (ii) are
satisfied. TNC A may simply avoid the operation of the normative rule that it will
be liable by easily modifying the factual position on the ground, so that the requi-
site level of integration or control is absent.51
51 A similar concern has been expressed about the normative reformulation put forward by Prassl
in J Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (2015): see H Collins, A Review of the Concept of the Em-
ployer by Dr Jeremias Prassl, available at <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/content/labour-law-0/blog/
2015/11/review-concept-employer-dr-jeremias-prassl>.
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Perhaps an alternative mechanism may exist that can plug the TNC A ac-
countability gap. One candidate which presents itself is ‘network liability’. This
would involve the ascription of legal recognition to what has hitherto, in the
large, been a theoretical concept discussed in the academic literature by scholars.
The main proponent of network theory is Prof Gunther Teubner.52 It entails the
imposition of liability on an identifiable legal person or persons where a variety
of autonomous economic entities are bound together via a chain consisting of a
cluster of interconnected contracts. What binds the network together is mutual
co-operation and a common commercial enterprise or objective. For obvious rea-
sons, the notion of ‘network liability’ is a particularly germane notion to capture
the crystallisation of liability where a string of contracts are entered into between
a number of separate legal entities operating along a vertically disintegrated sup-
ply chain. However, it is not confined to supply chain management arrangements,
since it is equally of relevance to distribution, producer and franchise networks,
as well as corporate group arrangements.
The fundamental purpose of network liability theory would be to ensure that
parties in the chain are held accountable where a wrong is done to a third party
such as an injured employee, citizen or consumer C. However, the main challenge
presented by network liability theory is the problem of boundaries. What is abun-
dantly clear is that the boundaries have to be identified in a way that ensures not
all of the parties in the network are liable where only one of the parties has com-
mitted an actionable wrong in contract or tort law, eg if TNC A enters into com-
mercial contracts with overseas suppliers BA1, BA2, BA3, BA4, BA5, and the em-
ployees of BA2 are injured owing to the conduct of BA2, it would be wrong to
impose horizontal liability on BA3, BA4 or BA5 if they are not directly responsible
for the relevant loss. However, it may be justifiable to impose shared vertical lia-
bility on TNC A and BA2 in such circumstances. The difficulty with recognising a
system of liability all along and up and down the supply chain is that the remedial
scheme will likely lack legitimacy. It is not always an easy choice to identify
where such supply chain network liability should begin and end, eg under what
kind of circumstances might it be appropriate to impose shared liability on TNC A,
52 G Teubner (eds), Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Cooperation (2009); G Teubner, Net-
works as Connected Contracts (2011); G Teubner, ‘And if I by Beelzebub cast out Devils, ...’: An
Essay on the Diabolics of Network Failure (2009) 10(4) German Law Journal 395; H Collins, Intro-
duction, in: G Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts (2011) 1;WW Powell, Neither Market nor
Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization (1990) 12 Research in Organizational Behaviour 295;
RM Buxbaum, Is ‘Network’ a Legal Concept? (1993) 149(4) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics 698; R Brownsword, Contracts in a Networked World, in: LA DiMatteo/Q Zhou (eds),
Commercial Contract Law: Transatlantic Perspectives (2013) 116.
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BA2 and BA3, BA4 and/or BA5 in the example given. Seen from that perspective,
where a series of parties are horizontally and vertically engaged in a common
enterprise, there is not necessarily a doctrinal solution to whether network liabi-
lity should be restricted to vertical liability up and down the supply chain, or
whether it should also encompass the ascription of legal exposure horizontally.
A concept similar to ‘network liability’ has recently been put forward by Ulf-
beck in this journal, namely ‘production liability’.53 Such a form of legal exposure
would involve the imposition of liability on TNC A in the context of global supply
chain management for the negligent actions of its suppliers BA1, contractors BB1,
or sub-contractors BC1. Its primary justification is rooted in the ‘reasonable expec-
tations’ of the employees of the suppliers BA1, contractors BB1, or sub-contractors
BC1. It would operate as a counterpart to product liability insofar as the notion of
‘cheapest cost avoider’ equally applies to TNC A as the best party to shoulder and
absorb the risks and costs associated with the commercial operations that are on-
going across the supply chain: TNC A ‘distributes risk[s] by setting the prices of
the product in the buyer driven [supply] chain...’.54 Such a development would
likely require Parliamentary intervention in the guise of legislation, and as such,
like network liability, it is nothing more than a mere possibility at this stage of
discussion.
Perhaps another option that is available to fill in the TNC A accountability
gap lies in the imposition of extra-territorial criminal liability under the criminal
law, rather than tinkering around at the edges (or heart) of existing private law
doctrine. In fact, there is already a precedent for marshalling the criminal law in
the guise of sec 7 of the Bribery Act 2010. Here, it is provided that a company such
as TNC A will be held criminally liable if a person B who is associated with it
engages in bribery intending to retain or win business for TNC A, or obtain or
retain an advantage in the conduct of business for TNC A. The fundamental point,
however, is that the bribery or corruption may take place overseas, since it is suf-
ficient if B would be gulty of an offence under secs 1 to 6 of the Bribery Act 2010
which may occur anywhere on planet earth. If we consider the current statutory
policy initiatives to counter the TNC A accountability gap in the context of the
abuse of human rights or labour standards, rather than specifically impose statu-
tory duties, which if breached, would render corporations such as TNC A statutory
liable in private law, Parliament has restricted itself to the imposition of manda-
tory corporate reporting obligations and human rights/labour standards due dili-
53 V Ulfbeck, Supply Chain Liability for Workers’ Injuries – Lessons to be Learned from Product
Liability (2018) 9 Journal of European Tort Law (JETL) 269.
54 Ulfbeck (2018) 9 JETL 269, 287.
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gence obligations. The classic illustrations in the UK are sec 54 of the Modern
Slavery Act 2015 and secs 414CA to 414CB of the Companies Act 2006, each of
which demand that qualifying corporations such as TNC A either (1)(a) investigate
and disclose their activities and those of their overseas subsidiaries and supply
chain partners in respect of the prevention of slavery and human trafficking,55 or
(b) explain that they have failed to undertake such steps,56 and (2) specify infor-
mation to the extent necessary to enable outsiders to understand their develop-
ment, performance and position and the effect of their activities affecting the out-
side world, including the environment, their employees, social issues, respect for
human rights and anti-corruption and bribery matters.57 At present, sec 54(11) of
the Modern Slavery Act 2015 prescribes that it is only the Secretary of State who
has the power to bring civil proceedings where a qualifying corporation fails to
comply with its statutory reporting obligations in these terms, and the remedy is
limited to an order or decree of injunction/interdict or specific performance/im-
plement. However, in practice, the UK Government has adopted a laissez-faire
approach and been reluctant to use these powers, relying on consumers, inves-
tors and Non-Governmental Organisations to investigate whether there has been
compliance and apply pressure on businesses.58 A more innovative solution to the
TNC A accountability gap – which would reflect broader policy concerns ex-
pressed at the outset of this article about the conduct of multinational companies
registered in the UK – would simply involve the extension of extraterritorial crim-
inal liability to TNC A for a breach of such statutory reporting and due diligence
obligations. This would entail a straightforward modification of sec 54 of the
Modern Slavery Act 2015 along the lines of sec 8 of the Bribery Act 2010. But more
symbolically, it would immediately transform the legal position from one reflect-
ing a somewhat trite exercise in incentivising disclosure and enhanced transpar-
ency to one that possesses real teeth designed either to prevent or punish human
rights or labour standards abuses. The irony is that the most recent report on the
operation of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 stopped short of recommending such a
reform.59 Instead, its proposals were somewhat anaemic as they were limited to
extending the statutory obligation in sec 54 to public sector organisations and a
suggestion that the legislation be changed to remove the ability of a qualifying
55 Modern Slavery Act 2015, sec 54(4)(a).
56 Modern Slavery Act 2015, sec 54(4)(b).
57 Companies Act 2006, secs 414CA and 414CB.
58 See Home Office, Transparency in Supply Chains etc. A practical guide (2015) 6.
59 See Independent Review of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, May 2019, CP100, available at <fil
e:///D:/Tort%20Law%20Vienna/Independent_review_of_the_Modern_Slavery_Act_-_final_
report.pdf> (last visited 5 June 2019).
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corporation to comply simply by saying that it had not carried out any steps to
prevent human trafficking or slavery.60
V Conclusion
As demonstrated by this article, the current private law doctrines recognised by
the Common Law place considerable barriers in front of workers (of subsidiary
companies or supply chain partners), citizens or other victims of abuses of human
rights and labour standards where they are seeking to recover their losses from
multinational companies located in the UK. Admittedly, there has been a degree
of evolution in the legal position in tort, which may offer some scope for plugging
the TNC A accountability gap. However, much developmental work in the con-
tours of the existing doctrine remains to be done by the judiciary before a fairer
distribution and allocation of liability finally emerges.
This article has probed the extent to which creative solutions could be
brought to bear over the current rules of tort law, private international law, com-
pany law and contract law, but, as noted in the discussion, there are limits inher-
ent within Common Law systems and their modes of reasoning. By their very na-
ture, the tools at the disposal of the judiciary are restricted, which stymie the ex-
tent to which the Common Law can be harnessed to adapt existing private law
doctrines in a manner which conforms to received policy expectations. The reality
is that legislative action is the primary means by which law reform will be under-
taken in Common Law regimes such as the UK, which itself gives rise to the addi-
tional consideration of political will. There may be the absence of such political
will, owing to concerns that legislative measures designed to plug the TNC A ac-
countability gap will generate adverse economic effects and incentives. For exam-
ple, by reforming the law to make it easier to hold locally based multinationals
such as TNC A to account for the torts or breaches of contract of their overseas
subsidiaries or supply chain partners, the costs of doing business of such an or-
ganisation will increase. If the costs mount, TNC A may decide to relocate else-
where, thus giving policymakers cause to question the wisdom of such legislative
measures in the first place when they are initially proposed.
In the final analysis, there are clearly difficult political choices involved here,
but we must not lose sight of the fact that prevention is always better than cure. In
60 See Independent Reviewof theModern SlaveryAct 2015,May 2019, CP100, available at <file:///
D:/Tort%20Law%20Vienna/Independent_review_of_the_Modern_Slavery_Act_-_final_report.pd
f> (last visited 5 June 2019) 14 f, 22, 24, 41 and 44.
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effect, developments such as the tightening up of legislative reporting and due
diligence obligations supported by criminalisation measures will assist in that
regard, eg in respect of TNC A where TNC A fails to adhere to transparency mea-
sures imposed under legislation such as the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and other
labour standards.
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